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Administering That Ounce of Prevention:
New Drugs and Nuclear Reactors-I
DAVID

F. CAVERs**

Everyone in this audience will undoubtedly agree that an ounce
of prevention is better than a pound of cure, though some conservatives may consider the 16-to-1 ratio is on the high side and prefer
the 9-to-1 ratio embodied in the proposition that a stitch in time
saves nine. Yet, for the two subjects of preventive action to which
I shall direct these lectures-new drugs and nuclear reactors-I
think it will appear that even the 16-to-1 ratio is far too modest.
I am concerned with the laws preference for prevention over
cure in these matters not only because I wish to examine with you
some problems of preventive legal action but much more because
the law's efforts in these two areas illustrate significant points of
confrontation between law and science.
In these days, in remarking the importance of science and technology in the problems that concern modern law, one is struck by
the great diversity of points of confrontation between the two disciplines. They range from such matters as the proper test for
criminal responsibility to the proper rules to govern the behavior
of man in outer space.' Yet, among these situations, the problem
frequently recurs whether to depend for the making of decisions
upon the processes that the legal profession has developed or upon
* This article will be published in two parts. The second installment will
appear in the April issue of the West Virginia Law Review. The written
product is a slightly revised version of the Edward G. Donley Memorial Lectures, delivered December 2 and 3, 1965, at the College of Law, West Virginia
University.
** Fessenden Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
I have canvassed some categories of these in Introduction, Science and
the Law Symposium, 63 MIcH. L. ,Ev. 1325 (1965), and, somewhat more
extensively, in an introductory paper, "Law and Science: Some Points of Confrontation" for a conference on "Law and the Social Role of Science" at the
Rockefeller Institute, New York City, April 8-9, 1965, the proceedings of which
are to be published.
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those to which the science-based professions are accustomed. We
shall see that issue emerge as we observe in these lectures the difficulties encountered in resolving what at first glance may appear
to be essentially medical and engineering questions.
There is, of course, nothing extraordinary today in a legal requirement obliging a duly authorized body to pass upon a proposed
action on the basis of scientific or technological evidence. To give
a homely illustration, I need only instance the building permit. I
have chosen from among the many examples of such requirements
the two very different determinations provided for new drugs and
the nuclear reactors for several reasons:
(1) Because of the intrinsic difficulty of the scientific and technological judgments that have to be reached by the decisionmaker.
(2) Because of the importance to the applicant of the approval
it seeks and, still more, the seriousness of the consequences of a
mistake or error of judgment if the procedure fails to prevent one,
and also because of the inadequacies of remedial measures available
after a mistake has been made.2
(3) Because, especially, of the perplexing difficulty of devising
a satisfactory procedure for granting approvals and for withdrawing them when necessary, a difficulty in which the different roles
played by the lawyer and the scientific expert are implicated. (I
should explain, incidentally, that I shall use the term "expert" to
cover the various categories of persons learned in the basic and
applied sciences whose scientific or professional knowledge is drawn
upon in decision-making in the two areas with which I shall be
concerned.)
The approval procedures of both the Food and Drug Administration-the FDA-and the Atomic Energy Commission-the AEC-follow the same general pattern: first comes an administrative evaluation of a proposal submitted usually by an industrial concern,
buttressed by scientific and technological data. In this evaluation,
2 Related to these considerations is the dependence of the exposed publics
on the correctness of the approval, the inability of drug users (sometimes even

physicians) and of the reactor's down-wind neighbors to make their own evaluations. In contrast, the purchaser of securities, aided by professional analysts,

is likely to fare relatively better if the SEC fails to elicit a full disclosure from
a corner-cutting issuer.
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the informed scrutiny of the regulatory agency's experts will focus
on the adequacy of the investigations and tests that have been performed and the experimental data these have yielded and will sometimes lead to improving proposed safeguards against whatever
hazards the new drug or nuclear reactor may create. Ordinarily
this administrative process is expected to terminate in definitive
action: the approval of a meritorious proposal or the disapproval
of a deficient one. However, should the views of the applicant's
experts conflict with those of the agency's, then the applicant has
the choice either to attempt to develop the bases of his application
further or to invoke the adversary process.
Up to this point, the lawyer has played a subsidiary role devoted
chiefly to organizing presentations and findings and assuring conformity to regulatory specifications. If the applicant chooses the
adversary process, the lawyer is now expected to take the center
of the stage, to marshall the data and expert opinions of the side he
represents while probing, with the aid of his experts, for weaknesses in the adversary's case. Above this battle sits the commissioner or the commission charged with deciding between the conflicting masses of testimony, striving where possible to cast findings
in terms of a choice between ascertained truth and disclosed error
(which may, of course, take the form of a deficiency of needed
data). Where, however, the problem is one of degree, the issue
must be resolved in terms of a judgment which may be confined
to the particulars of the specific case but which is likely to reflect
broader considerations of policy. At this stage, within limits that
the courts themselves have sought to keep narrow, the defeated
party can have recourse to judicial review. Should the court afford
no relief, there remains only the last resort, political action, figuratively described as "going to the polls," more aptly, as calling in
the lobbyists.'
This pattern is the product of over half a century's experience in
the United States in fashioning the procedures of federal regulatory
agencies. Experience, however, has been teaching that that pattern
does not fit the tasks which the FDA and the AEG are trying to perform in administering their respective ounces of prevention. That
experience has shown that so much of the pattern as looks to putting
3 Of course, political assistance need not be a 'last resort"; it is a remedy
that can be, and sometimes is, administered concurrently. The exhaustion-ofremedies doctrine does not pose a condition to its use.
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the adversary system into play just has not worked. The disappointed applicant will not stand up and fight, however strongly it
may believe in the merits of its cause. As a result, the lawyer has
no chance to perform his distinctive function; contested hearings are

few, and the courts have rarely been called on to review the administrator's judgments.
This may seem a consummation devoutly to be wished, even to
an audience of lawyers, at least to such an audience outside the
District of Columbia. Yet, though the problems presented by new
drug and reactor applications may come closer to the truth end of
that spectrum between truth and power which Dean Price identifies
in his recent volume on ThE Scimrnr c ESTATE,' the policy ingredient cannot be eliminated from the issues to be resolved. Wherever
a policy issue is present, some members of the public are likely to
challenge any exercise of the power to decide that issue which does
not afford an opportunity for the public to observe, if not to participate in, the decisional process.
As will be noted as I describe the predicaments in which the two
agencies have found themselves, it has been the FDA in which
decision-making has been left largely within the recesses of its
bureaucracy,5 whereas the AEC has sought, with uneven success, to
provide a reasonable facsimile of the traditional regulatory agency's
procedure. It is the FDA's procedure that I shall consider in this first
lecture, but, before I do so, I shall pause to demonstrate the importance of prevention as distinguished from cure in the FDA's
control of new drugs.
ThE

ImiPORTANCE OF PREVENTION:

NEw DRUGs

Today great process is being made in developing effective forms
of medication. New remedies have been proliferating until perhaps

90 percent of the prescriptions now being filled call for drugs not in
4

At 135. To this penetrating study of the relations of science and government, published in 1965, which cuts across a wide range of problems, these
lectures can add no more than a specialized appendx.
5 Although its proceedings remain secret, the FDA has been endeavoring to
communicate the bases of its decisions with respect to limitations on the use
of drugs and warnings concerning side effects and contra-indications by resort
to the brochures which must accompany drug samples sent to physicians and
drug shipments to pharmacists. The drug's manufacturer is required to disclose
in the brochure clinical and other evidence giving rise to the limitations or
warnings. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.106(b) (3) & (4) (1965).
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existence 15 years ago.' As was true of the drugs that preceded
them, for these new drugs "safety" is a relative concept. Even when
made and used carefully, drugs may cause harm. Individual reactions to them vary widely. Dosage that is safe and effective for one
person may be ineffective or harmful for another. Moreover, an
intrinsically harmless drug may be exceedingly dangerous if it is
ineffective since the ill-and their physicians-may rely upon that
drug until too late to resort to another, effective remedy. Yet, if
a drug is effective, its value in the absence of satisfactory alternatives may amply justify running whatever risks its use may create.
We have had a near-miss from a grim demonstration of the
tragedy that failure to detect and prohibit an unsafe drug can
cause. The drug that would have provided that demonstrationthalidomide-also provided the political impetus for the Drug
Amendments Act of 1962 on which my lecture is focused!
Thalidomide is a tranquilizer developed in Germany and sold
abroad in large volume under various trade names. An American
pharmaceutical firm undertook to produce it here, filing an application with the FDA under the "New Drug" provisions of the 1938
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, provisions themselves the product
of a drug tragedy-the sale of the poisonous Elixir Sulfanilamide
which killed over 100 people before it could be withdrawn.8
Probably all of you know the story of the stubborn refusal of
FDA's Dr. Frances Kelsey to clear thalidomide for use in this country before doubts as to its safety had been put to rest. While these
doubts persisted, news came from Europe of countless cases of
phocomelia-they totaled 5,900 in West Germany alone. Babies
whose mothers had taken thalidomide in early pregnancy were born
without arms or legs, their hands attached to their shoulders, producing seal-like flippers. To this story I shall add only a word as to
6 Statement of George P. Larrick, Commissioner of Food and Drugs,
Hearings on Drug Safety before Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations,
House Committee on Governmental Operations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 14
(1964). The amount spent on prescription drugs by consumers has grown from
about $150 million in 1940 to $2.2 billion in 1964. Ibid.
7 See HAsus, THE BEAL VoicE 181-93, 209 (1964).
The book provides
a colorful account of the legislative history of the 1962 amendments, including
the crucial role played by thalidomide tragedy.
8 The victims totaled 107, many of whom were children. See Young,
Social History of American Drug Legislationin DRuGs iN Our SocIET 217, 227
(Talalay ed. 1964); HAmus, supra note 7, at 182.
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some of its consequences abroad. Last spring the Times reported
that an association has been formed in Germany by parents with
thalidomide-deformed offspring. They are pressing the state for
help both in money and in special educational aids for their children. The German Government had already appropriated nearly
$2,000,000 to care for these children, and this is recognized as only
the beginning.' Yet, obviously money is no measure of the price in
heartbreak and despair that the children and their families must
pay for decades to come.
Even when a drug is approved after an investigation of its properties, a mistake by the sponsor which escaped detection or an error
in judgment by the evaluator can lead to a heavy cost in human
suffering to its users and to the erring manufacturer. A vivid example of this danger appears in the case of Mer/29, a drug developed to reduce cholesterol deposits in the arteries, a suspected
cause of coronary and arterial disease. The drug was approved on
the basis of reports by the manufacturer that had suppressed certain unfavorable data, a suppression that later led to the criminal
conviction of the corporation and three of its staff. However, long
before this was known, Mer/29 was widely marketed with much
fanfare. Many physicians prescribed it. After a year or so, however, a slow dribble of cases began in which patients using the
drug had developed cataracts or had experienced other, less serious
side effects.'0
These revelations accompanied a growing doubt as to the drug's
effectiveness. The FDA ordered its withdrawal, and its decision was
not contested. Since then the manufacturer has been the target of
over 700 law suits by users alleging injury. It has settled over 200
of these. In one of the few that have gone to trial, a verdict of
$175,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages was reduced on appeal to $425,000, the punitive damages
having been sliced in half. However, recently in Florida a jury
was instructed that the drug's maker would be liable only if neg9 N.Y. Times, June 20, 1965, p. 61.
10 The Mer/29 case is reported in Mmiz, THE TssrHEurc NiGnTMAm
ch. 11 (1965). It is also the subject of testimony and numerous exhibits in
Hearingson Interagency Coordinationin Drug Research and Regulation Before
the Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations, Senate
Committee on Governmental Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3 (1963).
(These hearings, chaired by Senator Humphrey, will hereinafter be cited as
Humphrey Hearings.)
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ligent in failing to foresee the kind of harm experienced by the
plaintiff, and it returned a verdict for the defendant. I suspect such
victories for the defendant will be few; before the troubles of
Mer/29 have come to an end, some one-the maker or its insurerswill have had to pay millions of dollars in settlements and judgments. Again, money damages are poor recompense for damaged
eyesight."
Once we are agreed that prevention is the end to be achieved,
we have to confront some basic questions. How much prevention
is enough? Pushing prevention as a goal to the exteme would
deprive humanity of many useful drugs. Rather than sacrifice the
therapy that would thereby be lost, our law permits some balancing
of risks against benefits. The question then becomes: how much
risk is too much risk? And where effectiveness is at issue, the
question may be: how much risk should be run for how little
efficacy? These questions are often posed for the FDA by the filing
of a new drug application and sometimes by the filing of a notice
that exemption is claimed for a drug for investigational use.'2
EmcrrvmE
HEmuN oF rm IND

INvWSTGAInG DRUG Sa-

AND

ss:

Whenever an application is relied on to present to an administrator both the facts and the question he must decide, there is no
adversary party to challenge the adequacy or the accuracy of the
case made by the applicant as he puts his best foot forward. Moreover, since action on a really new drug application must precede
experience with the drug in general use, the hazards of the applicant's product can be determined in advance only as these may be
revealed by the tests and clinical trials conducted by the applicant
or reported in the literature relating to similar products. Clinical
experience based on trials with 1,000 patients can provide no assurance that the hazard that manifests itself in one case in 10,000 has
been detected.
For a report on the State of Mer/29 litigation, see 27 FDC REP., Daucs
("The Pink Sheet") No. 32, 8 (Aug. 9, 1965) (hereinafter
cited FDC REP.). See also Mnrz, supra note 10, at 246. Plaintiffs' counsel
have formed a foundation to facilitate the prosecution of their claims.
',

AND CosMEncs

12 The FDA may terminate an exemption permitting interstate shipment of

an investigational drug if, "there is substantial evidence to show that the drug
is unsafe for the purposes and in the manner for which it is offered for investi-

gation use." New Drugs Regs., 21 C.F.R. § 130.3(d) (3) (1965). There are
ten other grounds for termination.
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This situation confronted the FDA as it operated under the 1938
Act's "New Drug" provisions. The FDA expert had to evaluate such
evidence as the applicant laid before him, guided perhaps more by
his confidence or lack of confidence in the applicant than by the
conclusiveness of the data presented. 3 Where doubts arose, the
standard tactic was to find the application incomplete, denying it
effectiveness unless reassuring information were provided on this
or that point. Since compliance was often time-consuming and
costly, representatives of the applicant would seek by pressure, by
persuasion, or by shrinking its labeling claims and adding to its
warnings to get clearance from the understaffed administrators.
More serious practices developed. The conviction in 1963 of a
Washington physician for submitting reports of non-existent clinical trials leads one to wonder how often creative imagination was
substituted for clinical observations." Even reputable pharmaceutical firms distributed investigational drugs so widely that when,
for example, the FDA sought to mop up the supply of thalidomide,
it had trouble in locating all the distributees, and many of the latter
had taken their duties so lightly that they could not identify all
the recipients among their patients.'" Some marginal firms even
found it possible to operate commercially by marketing an investigational drug for years-for eleven years in one case.'"
Just before the 1962 amendments the FDA took a step by regulation which it had hesitated to take during the 24 preceding years
when the 1938 law had given a legal basis for such action. The new
regulation' 7 prescribes conditions with which the manufacturer of
a new drug-called the "sponsor"-has to comply in order to obtain
' The sponsor of a new drug was not required to give the FDA advance
notice of his investigatory plan or the qualifications of his investigators, and the
NDA requirements were less demanding than those now in force. See 21 C.F.R.
pt. 2 (Cum.Supp. 1947). Charges of loose practice were not uncommon. See
Mnrz, supra note 10, ch. 7.
" The case of United States v. Dr. B. A. Robin (D.D.C. 1964)
is reported in Rosner, Criminal Liability for Deceiving the Food and Drug
Administration, 20 Food DRuG CosM. L.J. 446, 458 (1965). (The physician
lived in Silver Springs, Maryland, a suburb of Washington.)
', See HARm, supra note 7, at 209 referring to an FDA press release reporting, inter alia, that 2,528,412 thalidomide tablets had been distributed to
1,267 physicians.
' Turkel v. Food & Drug Administration, 334 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1964).
Krebiozen was marketed as an investigational drug for over ten years. See
Auster, Drug Regulation and the Public Health, 19 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J.
259,268 (1964).
21 C.F.R. § 130.3 (1965).
';'
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an exemption enabling it to ship the drug in interstate commerce
for investigational use prior to its approval by the FDA. The regulation also requires the sponsor to notify the FDA that it is claiming
exemption, and with that notice it must file its plan of investigation.
The regulation specifies 8 that the plan include one or more of three
phases, to be preceded by animal testing and other studies to show
that the investigational plan can be undertaken safely. The first
phase calls for testing phsysiological reactions to the drug, and the
second for testing its effects on a limited number of patients. The
third phase requires clinical trials, often involving large numbers
of patients, to test the drug's capacity to achieve the therapeutic
objectives the sponsor claims for it.
Together with its plan, the sponsor must send to Washington all
available information concerning the drug. Moreover, it must furnish the names of the individual investigators who are to conduct
the plan, stating their qualifications for the type of work to be done.
The sponsor and each investigator are required to keep records and
file periodic progress reports (though only the sponsor is required to
report to the FDA). If any alarming reaction occurs, the FDA must
be notified "immediately." Other adverse reactions also must be
reported "promptly." Moreover, since human beings are to be used,
not guinea pigs, all investigators are required to obtain the consent
of the subjects, "except where they deem it not feasible or, in their
professional judgment, contrary to the best interests," of the subjects. Some senators had tried to include in the 1962 amendments
a rigid requirement of consent.' 9 This had to be modified; sometimes the patient would lack capacity to consent, and sometimes
knowledge of the trial would be harmful to him. The legal and
ethical problems posed by human investigation are interesting and
complex enough to sustain another lecture, but, since they are
already the subject of a voluminous literature,"° I shall not pursue
them further.
All the information that the FDA requires goes into the notice
claiming exemption, a document known as the IND, letters symbolizing investigational drugs. These INDs, now arriving in Washing' 8 Form FD 1571, 21 C.F.R. § 130.3(a) (2) (1965), requires that, in attachment 10, the sponsor outline the phases of the planned investigation to
cover a. clinical pharmacology (in two phases) and b. clinical trial.
9 HAums, supra note 7, at 208.
20
For the most compendious collection, see CLnICAL INVEsTIcAION iN
MEDircm: LEGcAL, ETmcAL AND MonAL AsPEcTs (Ladimer & Newman eds.

1964).
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ton at the rate of seventy per month, plus amendments and supplements in the hundreds," are screened by none other than Dr. Kelsey,
now head of FDA's Investigational Drug Branch. Not long ago her
staff numbered 13 physicians and three other scientists working
under her direction; it now may be much bigger.2 2 If, in this
screening, an IND reveals a dangerous or inadequate investigation
plan, she gives that IND priority in the staffs work. In case of danger, the exemption may be terminated by order. 3 More often the
FDA simply calls attention to the IND's shortcomings, and the sponsor withdraws it pending the correction of its investigatory plan.
Needless to say, a screening process cannot be infallible,2" and,
since animal tests must serve as the chief basis for judgment at the
IND stage, uncertainties as to the inferences to be drawn from these
tests can lead to debatable conclusions. However, plainly the new
procedure has provided a more solid basis of fact for new drug
approvals and for reducing the hazards of drug investigation. One
might have supposed that its adoption would have been hailed by
the medical profession. However, the first IND regulations the FDA
proposed were blasted by the American Medical Association.2
The AMA critics thought the FDA was putting the clinical investigation of drugs into a straight-jacket and was usurping the medical
profession's responsibilities. Some criticisms were based on misunderstandings, and clarifying amendments were helpful, but the AMA
still is not reconciled. The burden of records and reports-"red
tape" to the scientist-is a real one. The AMA warned it would divert
21 In FY 1965, the FDA received 762 INDs, bringing the total number re-

ceived by the end of the year to 2,727. Twenty-six were withdrawn at the
FDA's request; 346, by their sponsors. Statement by Assistant Commissioner
Rankin, reported in FDC REP. No. 44 (Nov. 1, 1965).
22 See Kelsey, Comments in New and Investigational Drugs, 20 FoOD
DRUG Cosm. L.J. 86, 87 (1965). INDs also are reviewed by the Division of
Toxicological Evaluation and the Controls Evaluation Branch.
22 See note 12, supra; see Kelsey, The Investigational Drug Branch: A
Review of Objectives and Function, reprinted as Exhibit 208 in Humphrey
Hearings,
supra note 10, pt. 4, at 1662.
24
Examples of four instances in which the FDA permitted the use of investigational drugs to continue despite warnings from staff pharmacologists,
drawn from (as yet unpublished) hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-

governmental Relations of the House Committee on Governmental Operations,

March 23, 24 & May 4, 1965, are reported in Mmrrz, supra note 10, at 571.

25 See Comments of American Medical Association, Proposal to Amend
Regulations Pertaining to New Drugs for Investigational Use, October 9, 1962,
reproduced as Exhibit N in Humphrey Hearings,supra note 10, pt. 6, at 2921

(1963).
'6 See AMA Outlines Position on Drug Regulations, AMA Nmvs 7 (Aug.

17, 1964), reprinted in Humphrey Hearings, supra note 10, pt. 6, at 3069.
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scientific talent from drug investigation just as need for it was
expanding. The pharmaceutical industry echoed this warning.
Perhaps there has been some withdrawal of professional personnel from the field. Certainly the expense of the investigational
process is greater, not only because of record-keeping and reporting
requirements, but, much more importantly, because of the obligation
to establish the safety and effectiveness of drugs by thorough investigation. Pharmaceutical firms have been producing fewer new
drugs, though how much of the shrinkage is due to the restrictive
effects of the new regime and how much to the higher standards
imposed is not easily determined.2" Moreover, some students of
drug therapy view the smaller numbers as a blessing in disguise;
the industry is said to have been far too prolific in drugs that
merely modified drugs already available in very minor respects
while submerging physicians under an avalanche of these new
products.28 Moreover, the new rigor has given great impetus to the
science of clinical pharmacology, long a step-child among medical
specialties. The new requirements necessitate new techniques of
investigation, especially to check effectiveness and to identify side
effects. Inevitably, we shall learn much more about the effects of
drug action in the human body.
More serious are charges that challenge the objectivity of the
investigatory system. Clinical trials are conducted by physicians
under contract with sponsoring firms. The fees paid for this service
may be substantial, and out of this fact may arise the temptation
to provide the answers the sponsors would like to receive, a temptation that is enhanced wherever subjective elements bulk large in the
investigator's appraisal.29
27

Dr. Sadusk has stated that the average of NDAs received in FYs 195860 was 360 but that this fell to 262 in 1961. The number received in FY 1962
was 282; in 1963, 179; in 1964, 160. He suggested in an address to the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association that the high level attained in the
late 1950's was due to important drug discoveries in the preceding years and
that the "industry needs some more breakthroughs in new drug entities to keep
up with
the pace of the early 1950's." FDC RFP. No. 15, 18 (April 5, 1965).
28
Exemplifying professional concern are two articles: Friend, Current
Drug Therapy, 3 CLni. PHnmscoL. & TERAS.Pvrcs 557 (1962), and
Sheps & Shapiro, The Physician's Responsibility in the Age of Therapeutic
Plenty, 25

CmutuLA-oN

399 (1962), both reprinted as Exhibits 99 and 100 in

Humphry Hearings,supra note 10, pt. 2, at 640. See also Supplementary Statement by Senator Humphrey, supranote 10, pt. 5, at 2816.
29 See Payment for Drug Testing; "The Uneasy Muddle," Mmz, supra
note 10, ch. 14, For material bearing on this problem, see Humphrey Hearings,
supra note 10, pt. 4, Exhibits 206-7, at 1641.
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Moved by these considerations, critics have proposed drastic
institutional innovations, among them, the creation of non-profit
centers for all testing or for testing in specific fields, the pooling
of industry funds to be paid to investigators by a disinterested body,
the certification of clinical investigators so that a "CCI" would have
a standing comparable to that of a CPA.3" None of these measures
seems likely to be resorted to unless abuses under the existing system grow widespread. Most of the past criticisms have reflected
the loose practices prevailing before the new regulations not only
required investigators' qualifications to be reported but also imposed
record-keeping and reporting requirements upon them. However,
a further safeguard could be added and that, I believe without
statutory change. The sponsor could be required to include in its
new drug application the terms of its contractual arrangements
with its investigators.' If the rewards seemed disproportionate to
the difficulty of the investigation and the standing of the investigator, the FDA could proceed with duly enhanced viligance. Moreover, if these reports evidenced a disturbing trend, they would lay
a basis for further-reaching measures.
EVALUATING DRUc SAFETY AND

EFrcnwVNEss: HmtEuN or =. NDA

So much for the IND. When after months, perhaps years, a new
drug's sponsor has brought investigations under its IND to what it
considers a successful conclusion, its next major step is to file with
the FDA its New Drug Application or NDA.
30 These proposals are summarized in MINrz, supra note 10, at 406-16.
3,The Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act § 505(i) (3) (1962), 21 U.S.C. § 355
(i) (3) (Supp. 1964) (hereafter cited as "Act"), permits conditioning an exemption of a drug for investigational use on "the making of such reports .. by
* * .the sponsor of the investigation (including but not limited to analytical
reports by investigators) obtained as the result of such investigational use of
such drug as the Secretary finds will enable him to evaluate the safety and
effectiveness of such drug in the event of the filing of an application ...."
Information as to fees paid for such investigational use would not seem irrelevant to the drug's evaluation. If this provision seems too restrictive, resort could
be had to the, "authority to promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement
of this Act," conferred by §701(a), 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (Supp. 1964). However, the FDA believes that it cannot compel fee disclosure. See Humphrey
Hearings, supra note 10, pt. 4, at 1643. An AEC licensing board has required
the applicant to submit for in camera review portions of the contract between it
and its turnkey-contractor bearing on their respective safety responsibilities, a
requirement that does not appear to have been challenged in an unsuccessful
attack on other conditions imposed by the board. See In the Matter of Jersey
Central Power & Light Co., Docket No. 50-219, Initial Decision, Dec. 4, 1964,
aff'd in AEC Opinions & Orders, Feb. 18, March 21 & May 6, 1965, 2 CCH
AToM. ENERGY L. REP. ff 11, 249.
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An NDA that complies with the FDA regulations32 is likely to be
a formidable volume-or volumes. It reports the results of the
investigations, the bad along with the good. It cannot draw on
investigations reported in NDAs filed for similar drugs by the applicants competitors since NDAs are held confidential.33 The NDA
must also summarize the relevant literature and submit the labeling
the sponsor proposes to use in marketing his product. The importance of the labeling may later be crucial since the ultimate issue
will be whether the drug is safe and effective under the conditions
of use specified in the labeling. Moreover, the labeling must not
only claim what the drug can do but must also specify its dosage
and other conditions of use and identify side effects and contraindications. If the drug is too hazardous for self-medication, it is
classed as a prescription drug and subjected to special requirements,
among them a full disclosure of the good and bad effects of the
drug in the labeling and the summarization of side effects and
contra-indications in its advertising.34
The NDA, one of which has been known to absorb nine feet of
shelf space, goes to the Division of New Drugs in the FDA's Bureau
of Medicine. The 1962 Act gives the FDA 180 days to decide
whether to approve or disapprove. Suppose after, say, 150 days,
the Division were to tell the sponsor that more data were needed on
this point or more tests on that. If the sponsor refused to comply, the
FDA would rule the application incomplete and the applicant would
have the option to request the filing of the application over protest,
thereby assuring a re-evaluation of the application within 30 days
and, if it were not approved, the opportunity for a hearing to
decide whether it is approvable 6 A hearing then would absorb
much more time than that needed to furnish the data. Therefore,
the information, if obtainable, will be added in an amended application. The clock then starts running all over again. Clearly the
32 21 C.F.R. § 130.4 (1965).
3321 C.F.R. § 130.32 (1965), citing the Act § 301(j), 21 U.S.C. § 331(j)
(Supp. 1964), which, the regulation states, makes it an offense to divulge to
unauthorized persons any information acquired from a new-drug application
concerning
any process or method that is a trade secret."
34
Act § 503(b), 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (Supp. 1964), defining "prescription
drugs," and § 502(n) (3), 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (3) (Supp. 1964), requiring the
summaries and giving to the FDA regulatory power over them to the exclusion
of the Federal Trade Commission. For the requirement of faller disclosure in
labeling, see § 505(f), 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (Supp. 1964), and 21 C.F.R. § 1.106

(1965).
3
36

(1965).

Act § 505(c), 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (Supp. 1964).
For the regulation affording this option, see 21 C.F.R. § 130.5(d)
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180-day time limit means little; indeed, 540 days is said not to be
unprecedented as a period between initial filing and final approval.
The FDA hopes, however, that a larger staff, more advance guidance
to applicants, and, I need scarcely add, some computerization will
speed up its NDA operations.
The approval process is not one in which the FDA staff proceeds
between the dates of filing an application and final action on it in
isolation from the applicant. On the contrary, the FDA's requests for
additional studies and proposals for labeling changes may give rise
to, "many months or years of negotiation," to quote a phrase used by
a scientist with a major pharmaceutical firm, referring, no doubt,
to informal discussions and correspondence with FDA staff members. "Nonetheless," he continues, "with patience, perseverance,
time, and sometimes extraordinary effort, the NDA may be approved."3"
Sometimes, of course, FDA demands for more information or tests
cannot be met; the drug is one that simply cannot be shown to be
safe or effective. Facing that fact, the sponsor will drop its application, a less painful way of terminating its undertaking than to have
it denied. It is when the sponsor's executives firmly believe in a
drug and the FDA is not convinced that the really acute questions in
administering the ounce of prevention for new drugs actually arise.
The problem is essentially that of evaluating the evidence. Where
the tests show that the drug does some good and some harm as well,
does the benefit outweigh the risk?
If the application is denied, some people whom the drug might
have helped will be denied relief. The responsibility for decision
is a grave one. The final decision is made by the Commissioner of
Food and Drugs who, from 1906 until January, 1966, had never
been a physician, although some incumbents, including the first
one, the famous Dr. Harvey W. Wiley, had been scientists.
Trm REvIEw

OF DENIALS OF APPRovAL AND WiTrnm1wArS

What is a sponsor to do when its drug is denied approval? It may
have invested much money and many hopes in the product. Its
scientists may be convinced that the FDA is wrong. Doubtless its
lawyers will want the decision reviewed.
37 See Beyer, New and Investigational Drugs, 20 FooD DaU
75,78 (1965).
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If there is pressure for review where approval has been denied,
plainly there is even more when an approval, once given, is withdrawn. The FDA may do this on the basis of new evidence or a
revaluation of the original evidence in the light of new developments, either clinical experience or scientific findings. 8 The withdrawal not only destroys the market for a possibly profitable
product, but it lowers the standing of the applicant, and this may
hurt the sale of its other products as well. It also may affect adversely the outcome of pending liability suits.
To meet an applicant's desire for review, the law has provided
an elaborate mechanism. As I reported early in this lecture, that
mechanism has not worked, or, to be more accurate, has not been
tried.
The 1962 amendments provide a procedure to review an order
denying approval or withdrawing a prior approval that is basically
similar to that provided in the new drug provisions of the 1938 act.
The aggrieved applicant is entitled to full public hearing before
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.3 9 In actual fact
the hearing would be held before a hearing examiner. His report
would be reviewed and a decision reached by the Secretary's delegate, none other than the Commissioner of Food and Drugs."0 One
may predict with some confidence that, unless the applicant can
bring significant new testimony to the fore or can dissipate misunderstandings concerning its product, the Commissioner will reach
the same decision after the hearing that he had reached before it,
since the latter decision would have been rendered only after a
careful appraisal of the applicant's case informally presented.
Once the 'Commissioner has decided to stand his ground, the
applicant may take the case to a federal court of appeals for judicial
review.4" The review is on the record, and no new ground of objection may be presented unless there were reasonable grounds for
failing to urge it below. Moreover, the Act prescribes that, "the
finding of the Secretary as to the facts, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive." More evidence may be taken if the
38
Act
39
40 Act

§ 505(e), 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (Supp. 1964).
§ 505(c), 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (Supp. 1964).
Full provisions governing the procedure for new drug hearings, including their conduct by a hearing examiner, appear in 21 C.F.R. §§ 130.14-130.26
(1965).
41

Act § 505(h), 21 U.S.C. § 355(h) (Supp. 1964).
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court finds there were reasonable grounds for its non-production,
but it: is the Commissioner who must evaluate the new evidence. If
the court upholds his order, the court's decision is subject only to
review in the Supreme Court on petition of certiorari, a petition one
may predict that body will be reluctant to grant.
In 27 years, under the 1938 and 1962 acts, about 13,000 applications have been processed and many denied or withdrawn. Yet only
a single applicant has carried its case through the administrative
hearing stage. 2 Having lost there, it went no further. Accordingly,
we see that the new drug decisions are made wholly within the FDA
without public scrutiny-you will recall that NDAs are confidential-without public hearing, and without any formal review.
Maybe this is as it should be. Maybe the only way to get the best
possible decisions is by getting the best possible people on the FDA
staff, providing decent quarters and adequate equipment, giving
them some chance for research of their own and access to first-rate
expert advice when they believe they need it. Some important segments of the industry are of this view.43 So is the FDA. Another
viewpoint, however, exists within the industry and on the part of
some spokesmen for the medical profession. 4 Those who hold it
contend that an applicant ought not to be at the mercy of a bureaucratic judgment even if able people have become bureaucrats. The
42
This was a withdrawal hearing. In the matter of "Altafur Tablets,"
Docket No. FDC-D-62, summarized in 24 FDC REP. No. 34, at T & G 4 (Aug.
20, 1962). See also Humphrey Hearings,supra note 10, pt. 3, exhibits 130, 131,
at 945.
43 In objecting to, "an extracurricular advisory committee," H. Thomas
Austern of the Washington bar, who is active in food and drug law practice
and an Adjunct Professor of Law at New York University, has declared, "These
groups will be active privately, on evidence not of record, and, I believe,
exposed to every type of direct and and indirect lobbying." Austern, Sanctions
in Silhouette: An Inquiry into the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, 18 Food DRuG Cosm. L.J. 617, 626 (1963). For the FDA
position, see Letter by Commissioner Larrick, Sept. 9, 1963, Humphrey Hearnote 10, pt. 4, 1860.
ings,4supra
4
It is advocated by Dr. Austin Smith, president of the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association, Hearings on Drug Safety, supra note 6, pt. 1, at
289, 357, and Humphrey Hearings, supra note 10, pt. 5, at 2221, and by
Lloyd N. Cutler, who has served as counsel to the same body, in Practical
Aspects of Drug Legislation in DnRs 3N OtR SoCn=r 149, 154 (1964). Dr.
I. S. Ravdin, vice president for medical affairs, University of Pennsylvania,
urged an, "independent, impartial reviewing council made up of highly qualified practitioners and scientists,'" in a letter in the AMA NEws (Apr 27,
1964). His view was endorsed by the Greater Philadelphia Commission for
Medical-Pharmaceutical Sciences. Hearings on Drug Safety, supra note 6, pt.
1, at 357.
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best obtainable regulatory officials are not likely to have a professional and scientific standing equal to that of the leaders in the
particular fields of medicine and science that may be involved.
Before a final decision is reached at the administrative level, these
critics contend, an applicant ought to be able to present his case
to a panel of expert advisers. They may not often decide in his
favor, but if and when they do, their decision is likely to be respected by the Commissioner. Moreover, the critics argue that the
mere power to demand review will assure the applicant a more
careful evaluation of its NDA.
This difference of opinion as to the decision-making process
marked a case which came closer to the hearing stage than any
since the Drug Amendments of 1962 were enacted. At the risk of
oversimplifying its medical aspects, I shall describe the problem of
decision-making that it posed.

Tim

PARNATE CASE

The drug in question is Parnate, trade name for tranylcypromine,
one of a class of anti-depressant drugs known as MAO inhibitors."5
(These letters refer to mono-amine oxidase and have no connection
with the uninhibited Mr. Mao of Peking.) Parnate's application
became effective in February 1961. Its sales and sales abroad of
tranylcypromine under other trade names were large. In six months,
however, came reports of three cases in England and four in the
United States in which tranylcypromine users suffered hypertension
manifested by severe headaches and rapidly rising blood pressure. These led the FDA to require a warning of this reaction to be
inserted in Parnate's labeling.
As time went on, reports of adverse reactions stepped up. Moreover, these went beyond headaches and high blood pressure.
Strokes-cerebro-vascular accidents, as the profession calls thembegan to be reported, with 14 deaths. An odd phenomenon appeared, first reported in England, most dramatically in the case
of a 19 year-old boy who, though depressed, was in good physical
45

My brief report of the Parnate case is based on summaries of the case
prepared by the staff of the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations,
supra note 5, which investigated the handling of the drug last June, and by
Dr. J. F. Sadusk, Jr., FDA Medical Director, for presentation in the hearings. (These probably will soon be published.) The case also is discussed
in Mnrz, supra note 10, at 199-213.
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health and at work. After a hearty lunch of bread and cheese one
day, the boy took the prescribed dose of the drug and in two hours
was dead. His case and certain others revealed that the drug suppressed an enzyme which would otherwise have coped with the
tendency of amines in the cheese to increase blood pressure. Certain
other foods have since been detected in this sinister interaction,
pickled herring among them.
In September 1963, at the FDA's behest, the company sent out a
strong warning letter-commonly called a "Dear doctor" letter. This
was mailed to nearly 270,000 medical men. It led to an influx of
new reports of adverse reactions. The FDA then solicited the opinions of eleven experts whose consensus was distinctly adverse to
the drug. They thought it not effective enough to justify the risks
its users were running. In February 1964, after conferring with the
company, Commissioner George Larrick proposed to hold a hearing
with a view to an order of withdrawal. The company then announced a decision to withdraw Parnate from the market but
refused to withdraw the approval of its application. It asked that
the hearing not be public, but the Commissioner refused. It also
asked that the views of AMA and American Psychiatric Association
committees first be received. This too was declined on the ground
that experts had already been consulted. Battle-lines had been
drawn when, at a pre-hearing conference, the company proposed an
extensive revision of Parnate labeling.
Just before this action, the long vacant directorship of FDA's
Bureau of Medicine had been filled. The new director was Dr.
Joseph F. Sadusk, Jr., a highly respected physician, head of the
Department of Preventive Medicine of George Washington University School of Medicine." Dr. Sadusk may have seen in the
Parnate case a chance to put to the test his philosophy that the FDA
must, "depend on the physician to apply those principles of balancing efficacy against toxicity at the individual patient level.""7 Though
his staff was divided, Dr. Sadusk recommended, after informal
consultations with an unprecedented number of experts, that the
4

6 For a resum6 of Dr. Sadusk's career, see Hearings on Drug Safety, supra
note 6, pt. 1, at 168.
47The quotation is from an address by Dr. Sadusk at the AMA Convention on June 23, 1964, about a week after the Parnate decision. For the text

of the address, which discusses the Parnate case, see Sadusk, The Physician

and the FDA, 19 Food Daeu CosM. L.J. 451, 453 (1964).
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FDA accept a revision of Parnate's labeling, and, on the very eve of
the public hearing for its withdrawal, the hearing was canceled.
The new labeling required that Parnate's use be confined to cases
of severe depression for patients under close observation for whom
other anti-depressant drugs and electro-convulsive therapy were
contra-indicated and who were not over 60 years of age and had
no prior history of hypertension. The permitted dosage was reduced
to half the previous dosage, and warnings were appended against
use with cheese and with certain other suspected foods and drugs.
Parnate went back to the market, but opinion remained divided.
Some viewed FDA's action as a capitulation to industry. Others saw
it as a balanced judgment in which benefit had been wisely set off
against risk, avoiding a protracted hearing, with one array of experts pitted against another.
The FDA almost certainly could have found substantial evidence
to sustain its order on the ground that the drug was unsafe. For
rulings as to effectiveness, a special definition of "substantial evidence" is prescribed by the 1962 amendments, and the burden of
satisfying this rests with the applicant. For this purpose, "substantial
evidence" means
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by
scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness
of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and
responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will
have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the
conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in
the labeling or proposed labeling
of the drug.48
It should be noted that an applicant who satisfies this exacting
definition is protected from an adverse finding based on the fact
that the record includes other evidence to the contrary which could
be viewed as "substantial." However, the makers of Parnate were
not in a good position to take advantage of the term. Only a few
carefully controlled investigations had been performed to test Par48

Act § 505(d), 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (Supp. 1964).
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nate's effectiveness, and they were far from conclusive.49 Though

the relevant field of medicine is not one wherein reliable judgments
are easy to come by, most of the testimony which Parnate's makers
had amassed reported the opinions of clinicians and case reports
in their files. Only under a most relaxed interpretation of the
"substantial evidence" test could Parnate have been found effective.
Moreover, a finding by the Commissioner that the applicant had
failed. to present substantial evidence in the defined sense would
itself have been a finding of fact supported by substantial evidence
in the usual sense. Therefore, it would be sustained by the Act's
provision that the Secretary's finding as to the facts, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. It seems plain that
the FDA was under no legal compulsion to clear Parnate.
REVIEW BY A PANEL OF ExPERTs?

Would a better way of resolving the problem have been to accept
the proposal of Parnate to submit its claim to the judgment of a
panel of experts, despite the extensive informal consultation of
experts that had preceded the decision? 0
This suggestion presents new problems. Who would choose the
experts? How would they meet, in private or publicly? What
evidence might they consider? Whom might they consult?
If the experts themselves had been asked, I think they would have
had quick answers for these lawyers' problems. The experts would
doubtless have had the panels chosen by a committee of "the best
men" in the profession. This committee would choose a panel of
49 The number of "controlled studies" is uncertain, a condition that
doubtless reflects some uncertainty in the concept itself. In MniTz, supra
note 10, at 199, it is stated that the 190 articles discussing tranylcypromine
published by the spring of 1964 included only four controlled clinical studies
and that these had not, "yielded clear-cut evidence of efficacy." Id. at 200.
In Dr. Sadusk's statement to the Subcommittee on Governmental Operations
in its June, 1965, hearings on Parnate, as yet unpublished, he refers to eleven
controlled studies evaluated for the FDA by Dr. Jonathan Cole of the Psychopharmacology Service Center. The Subcommittee's summary of the testimony
at its Parnate hearing reports Dr. Sadusk as having stated in a meeting with
Parnate's manufacturer that, "the studies available at the time [June 5, 1964]
did not meet the definition of 'substantial evidence' of effectiveness under the
Drug Amendments of 1962." Criticism of the studies in the hearing lends
support to this view.
5OAs reported in the text, supra at p. 126, Parnate's makers proposed
that the views of AMA and American Psychiatric Association committees be
received before any hearing was held. I am informed that the FDA obtained
informally the views of more than 100 physicians.
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"the best men" in the branches of the profession most concerned
with the problem. The panelists would, if they felt any need for
help, then consult with the people whom they considered "the best
men" to afford them aid. They would talk to whom they pleased
and listen to whom they pleased, making such discounts as the
existence of conflicts in interest among their informants suggested.
When the time came to make up their minds, they would meet
privately, and let the Commissioner have their conclusions, not a
transcript of their discussions.
To lawyers this procedure is shocking. What is to prevent backstairs influence, lobbying with the panel, ex parte presentation of
a one-sided story which the other side has no opportunity to rebut?' Is it enough that conflicts of interest be recognized in order
to avoid them? The conflicts question is consequential since virtually all potential panelists would have done work on occasion for
pharmaceutical firms.
The division on this issue throws light on a basic difference in
approach between scientists and lawyers. Scientists-and related
professionals as well-want to get the best man or men to resolve
a problem and then to leave the matter up to them, giving them
freedom to work privately and in confidence. Moreover, the scientists are confident that they can tell who the best men are, that they
know whom they can fully trust.
The lawyer, on the other hand, wants the best procedure, one
that will provide the greatest assurance of fair play and minimize
the chance for manipulation, even when the people who operate it
and on whom it operates are not "the best men" and, indeed, may,
if not carefully watched, prove all too susceptible to bias and
pressures.
Perhaps these differences reflect differences in the fields of learning and in the people with which the two groups must deal. These
differences, I suspect, may affect many of the relations between
what we call "law" and "science."
There are two other provisions for administrative approvals in the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act which make specific provision for
5' See note 43, supra; see also Humphrey Hearings, supra note 10, pt. 4,
at 1857.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1966

21

West
Virginia
Law Review,
Vol. REVIEW
68, Iss. 2 [1966], Art.[Vol.
20 68
VIRGINIA
LAW
WEST

the use of advisory committees, one for determining tolerances for
the residues of pesticide chemicals on raw agricultural commodities,52 the other for determining whether a color additive in a food,
drug or cosmetic is carcingoenic, that is, can cause cancer. 3 The Act
contemplated that individuals for these committees would be nominated by the National Academy of Sciences but, if it declined to
do so, by the Secretary of HEW, that is, by the Commissioner of
Food and Drugs. The National Academy has served in this capacity, but it has indicated that it does not wish to provide panel
nominations for ad hoc committees for new drugs." Accordingly,
the FDA would have to make its own selections.
It is noteworthy that, though the problems of pesticide residue
tolerances and the carcinogenicity of color additives are distinctly
controversial, panels have been summoned very seldom in formal
proceedings though the FDA has often consulted expert groups. Of
course, the applicant's right to demand a panel may have induced
the FDA to turn more often to outside experts before its decisions
were reached. This suggests the possibility that their use could
advantageously be institutionalized for new drug clearances and
withdrawals. For each branch of medicine a panel of experts might
be chosen by their peers and be prepared to serve as consultants
whenever FDA encountered a serious problem in passing upon an
NDA. 5 An eminent pharmacologist of my acqaintance is convinced
not only that this practice would yield sound decisions but also that
having the back-up of outside experts would enable the FDA staff
to reach decisions more quickly and so would help in cutting down
the big backlog of NDAs.
Such a procedure might work well. It has an analogue in an
important unofficial body, the Committee of Revision of the United
States Pharmacopoeia which determines the eligibility of drugs for
5

1964).

Act § 408(b)(d( (1954), 21 U.S.C. § 346
§ 4Act
706(b)

)(B)

()()((1''d1)

(1960), 21 U.S.C. § 37()

(5)13)

.
(Supp.

" See Statement by Dr. R. K. Cannan, Chairman, Division of Medical
Sciences, National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, June
21, 1963, Humphrey Hearings, supra note 10, pt. 3, at 983; id. pt. 4, at 1857.
The Academy's position reflected a decision to form its own committee
system for drug research.
s' The FDA is now establishing advisory committees in various branches
of medicine. The principal difference between these and the plan suggested
in the text is that the suggested advisers would be consulted with greater
frequency and as individuals rather than as a committee.
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listing in that authoritative compendium. 6 However, I doubt that
it would resolve every case. Surely sometimes the experts would
disagree. Provision has to be made for the case where the FDA and
the applicant are deadlocked, however seldom that case may arise.
In such a case a public hearing would be necessary, even though
the applicant might prefer his case to be decided behind closed
doors. But who should sit in judgment? Certainly the Commissioner cannot do so. His duties do not permit him to spend days and
perhaps weeks in presiding as a judge in a hard-fought hearing.
Probably, moreover, he will be neither a lawyer nor a physician.
His instincts may be sound in gauging the wise policy to follow
once the facts have emerged, but, if these are in doubt, he is not
likely to be expert in evaluating the conflicting testimony. Certainly
the ordinary hearing examiner is not. He is a lawyer skilled in
guiding the course of the hearing as its presiding officer and in
ruling on procedural points. However, if he makes findings of his
own, they are the findings of a layman. The Commissioner, whether
layman, scientist or physician, is not materially advanced by them
in reaching his own decision.
SPOKESMEN

FOR THE

CoNsUmR ARE HEAD FROM

So far, I have discussed problems of decision-making as if the
only question were how to assure fair treatment of the applicant
against biased or ill-informed bureaucrats. However, there is another question for us to worry about: can the bureaucrat always be
counted on to protect the public interest?
The phenomenon of the regulators' becoming the protectors of the
regulated is not unknown to Washington. Indeed, it is commonly
charged that, in the course of time, staffs of regulatory agencies
either become prone to adopt the viewpoint of the regulated industry (which, unlike the drug industry, is often in economic difficulties) or, worse, become hopeful of joining its ranks. 7 The FDA
56 The United States Pharmacopoeia is recognized an "official compendium" and, as such, as a source of standards of strength, quality and purity for
the drugs recognized therein. See Act § 501(b), 21 U.S.C. § 351(b) (Supp.
1964).

For a description of the Pharmacopoeia's structure, together with the

personnel of its committees, see Humphrey Hearings, supra note 10, pt. 4,
exhibit 182, at 1333.
57Te charge is made as to regulatory agencies generally by Senator
Paul H. Douglas in Ermcs nr GovENMENT 29-30 (1952). It is quoted and
applied to the FDA in Mnrz, supra note 10, at 418.
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has fared better than most agencies in avoiding suspicion on these
counts, but it has not escaped unscathed. The drive for legislation
that led to the 1938 Act was initiated by a volume entitled ONE
HuNDVn MILLION GuiNEA PIrs58 which directed its polemics not
only against the industries but also against the FDA. So does the
newly published volume, Tim TBmu unrrc NiGHmsrx., by Morton
Mintz, which joins the FDA with the AMA and the PMA-the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association-as co-defendants. The
volume draws heavily on hearings before committees presided over
by Senators Kefauver5 9 and Humphrey." Only last spring the
subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the House Committee on Government Operations, chaired by Representative Fountain of North Carolina, brought the FDA's administration of the
new drug laws under fire.6
These hearings, particularly the most recent, demonstrate the
difficulty of administering a regulatory law behind closed doors.
The Fountain Committee wants to know just how FDA's decisions
were reached, by whom, and on the basis of what deliberations. For
example, the Subcommittee spent two days of hearings on the Parnate decision last June. It directed other hearings to other close
5

8 This volume by Arthur Kallet and F. J. Schin was published in 1933.
It soon became a best-seller. Mr. Schlink was co-author with Stuart Chase of
YoUR MONEY'S WORT published in 1927. This volume led to the formation
of Consumers' Research, Inc., which, in addition to evaluating consumer
products, urged better consumer legislation. See Corbett, The Activities of
Consumers' Organizations, 1 LAw & CoNmT. PnoB. 61 (1933). Subsequently, Mr. Kallet left the organization and became a founder of Consumers'
Union.
'9 See Hearings on Administered PricesBefore the Antitrust and Monopoly
Subcommittee, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pts.
14 & 15 (Corticosteroids); pts. 15 & 17 (Tranquilizers); pt. 18 (General:
Physicians and Other Professional Authorities); pt. 19 (General: Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association); pt. 20 (Oral Antidiabetic Drugs); pt. 21
(General: Generic and Brand Names); pt. 22 (The Food and Drug Administration); pts. 24, 25 & 26 (Antibiotics) (1960-61).
60 See Humphrey Hearings, supra note 10, pts. 1 & 2 (Review of Cooperation on Drug Policies among Agencies) (1963); pt. 3 (The Bureau of
Medicine in the Food and Drug Administration) (1963); pt. 4 (Specialized
Drugs and Drug Problems) (1964); pt. 5 ( (1) Commission on Drug Safety,
(2) Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, (3) Medical Education on
Drug Therapy and Other Drug Issues) (1964); pt. 6 (Drug Activities of the
American Medical Association) (1964). The dates are of publication; the
hearings in parts 1 and 2 were held in 1962; the others, in 1963. Many of
the 3228 pages are devoted to exhibits.
61 See Hearings on Drug Safety, supra note 6, pts. 1 & 2, reporting
hearings held between March 24 and June 18, 1964. Hearings held in the
spring of 1965 are as yet unpublished.
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decisions"2 and, if one may gauge the assumptions with which it
began the tenor of its inquiries, the Subcommittee and its staff
believe that the FDA had been soft on the drug industry to the
detriment of the public.
Dr. Sadusk of the FDA stoutly defended his Parnate decision. 3
He saw it as a vindication of his policy of trusting the medical profession. He pointed out that, since August 1964, when Parnate went
back on the market, it had been administered to an estimated
122,000 patients. Only four strokes involving users had been reported in the United States since the drug's marketing under its
new labeling, no deaths having resulted in the four cases. (Since
then a questionable new case of mortality has been reported.) Dr.
Sadusk noted that the incidence of reported strokes to patients
treated with Parnate is .33 per 10,000 which he compared with the
mortality rates for other anti-depression treatments: 8 fatalities
among 10,000 patients given electric-shock therapy; 10 fatalities
among the same number treated by central nervous system stimulants; and 60 fatalities among 10,000 for insulin shock therapy.
Behind these figures is another which he did not present: the grim
suicide rate in cases of severe depression," a factor which brings
Parnate's dubious efficacy into the evaluation of its safety.
With his administration of the Medical Bureau under fire, Dr.
Sadusk assembled the FDA's Medical Advisory Board for a meeting
last July. The Board, after a review of the Parnate and other problem cases, agreed with his judgment and complimented him on the
6

2E.g. to meclizine (sold as Bonine) and cyclizine (sold as Marezine),
over-the-counter drugs used in treating nausea, dizziness, and motion sickness,
which have been suspected, on the basis of animal studies only, of causing
birth deformities. The changes in position by Dr. Sadusk on the questions
whether these drugs should be declared prescription drugs and, if not, what
warning label they should bear were a subject of inquiry. Their handling is

described in Ridgeway, Feeling Dizzy?, THE Nmv REPUBLIc 15 (Oct. 1965).
For criticism of FDA's later decision to require a strict warning, see Cure That

Kills, BSARoN's 1 (Nov. 1, 1965).
63 See note 45, supra.
64Statistical rates as

to suicides among severely depressed persons (of
which psychiatry recognizes several categories) present diversities which reflect
the variety of universes from which the samples are taken. Clearly, however,
these suicide rates are many times higher than the mortality rates among
patients being treated by any of the methods which Dr. Sadusk compared
to Pamate. If Parnate were materially less effective than those other methods
in preventing suicide, the fact that it did not cause deaths through its own

action would not, of course, justify its use. However, the new required
labeling indicated Parnate for use only where electroconvulsive therapy could
not be used and other antidepressant drugs were ineffective.
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progress of his administration. Then it turned its guns on the Subcommittee's position on the issues of confidentiality of the Bureau's
decision-making.6 5
Counsel to the Subcommittee had asked for records of adverse
reactions reported to the FDA with respect to certain drugs, seeking
the names of the patients, their physicians and hospitals. The Advisory Board declared this a violation of the confidential doctorpatient relationship that had to be preserved if the adverse reaction
reporting system which the FDA is striving to develop is to survive.
The Subcommittee also had sought transcripts of conferences between the FDA staff, its medical advisers and industry representatives. In such joint conferences, the Board declared, "the most
effective method of communication involves a high degree of mutual respect and courtesy." Evidently the Board anticipated congressional criticism on the score of failure to maintain the adversary
spirit in these contacts with the industry.
The Board also resolved that the Subcommittee's efforts to secure
the tapes and transcripts of advisory committee meetings would
destroy the usefulness of such gatherings. It pointed out that, on
controversial issues, there would be differences of opinion that
should be aired in a frank and free discussion. This should be
recorded to permit review. After review and the making of recommendations, the tapes and transcripts should be destroyed. "Under
no circumstances," the Board declared, should they be, "transmitted
to a third party."
Finally, the Board noted that the Subcommittee was probing the
differences of opinion as to the handling of problem cases within
the FDA's medical staff, differences that apparently had been sharp.
The Board declared that the final decision must be that of the head
of the medical staff and that, accordingly, the contrary views of his
subordinates should not be set against his. This issue has long been
a bone of contention between the Executive Branch and the Congress. V/hen the Congress is challenging decisions made by department or bureau heads, it likes to look for dissent and to attack a
bureau chief's views by invoking his staffs arguments which he had
rejected in reaching his own conclusion.
65 For the text of resolutions passed at a meeting of the FDA's Medical
Advisory Board, see 27 FDC REP. No. 29, at 24 (July 19, 1965).
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Through all these problems that the Subcommittee's probe has
brought to the fore, there runs a recurrent conflict of values. On the
one hand, we have the concern of the governmental agency to enlist
the full cooperation of a profession which has long been committed
to confidentiality and hostile to the adversary process. On the other
hand, we have the public's concern to assure the vigilance of its
protectors in preventing harm from risks created by an industry
that may be over-eager to exploit new and hazardous drugs. Secrecy
in the decision-making process, the denial of knowledge concerning
it to the public, breeds the suspicion that the public's interest is
being sacrificed, a suspicion that can scarcely be overcome by the
FDAs practice of requiring extensive disclosure of adverse findings
in the brochures accompanying the prescription drugs that it approves." To satisfy the public's desire to know fully would play hob
with the industry's interest in being able to reap the reward of
successful research in discovering and developing a new drug. This
it can best do by concealing its investigational procedures and
experience and its manufacturing techniques from its rivals long
enough to establish a firm grip on the market for the drug. Public
proceedings also may bring new problems to the fore, as the AEC
has found in the licensing of nuclear reactors. In my next lecture,
I shall examine the AEC's problems in administering its ounce of
prevention and contrast them with those of the FDA. The AEC's
experience has suggested to me some measures which might on
occasion afford a means of escaping the dilemma that confronts
the FDA.
66 See note 34, supra. The disclosures currently required, while necessarily abbreviated and unable to provide analyses of the investigatory procedures followed, are more revealing than may be supposed. Thus the
brochure (commonly called the "package insert") for Indocin (trade name
for indomethacin), a new and apparently effective "anti-rheumatic" drug with
a unique chemical structure, is acompanied, perhaps because of its uniqueness,
by a statement about 750 words long reporting contra-indications, a warning,
precautions and adverse reactions. For example, it notes toleration of the
drug by a few patients with regional enteritis treated for from four to six
months but adds, "in view of the paucity of the data," the drug should not
as yet be given to patients in that category. It reports that "[situdies in mice
demonstrated that Indocin crosses the placental barrier," and concedes that
its, "safety for use in pregnant patients has not been established." It
recognizes that the drug may cause gastro-intestinal ulceration, and adds,
"There have been reports of severe bleeding and of perforation with a few
fatalities." Other adverse reactions are similarly treated.
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